



# ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Proxy Voting Guidelines  
Benchmark Policy Recommendations

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Coverage Universe</b> .....	<b>4</b>
<b>1. Operational Items</b> .....	<b>5</b>
Approval of Financial Statements and Statutory Reports .....	5
Appointment of Auditors and Auditor Fees .....	5
Appointment of Internal Statutory Auditors .....	5
Allocation of Income/Dividend Distribution .....	5
Stock (Scrip) Dividend Alternative .....	6
Amendments to Articles of Association.....	6
Change in Company Fiscal Term .....	6
Lower Disclosure Threshold for Stock Ownership .....	6
Amend Quorum Requirements .....	6
Transact Other Business .....	6
<b>2. Board of Directors</b> .....	<b>7</b>
Director Elections .....	7
Independence .....	7
Composition.....	7
Accountability.....	8
Classification of Directors .....	10
Contested Director Elections .....	11
Discharge of Directors .....	11
Director, Officer, and Auditor Indemnification and Liability Provisions .....	12
Board Structure .....	12
<b>3. Capital Structure</b> .....	<b>13</b>
Share Issuance Requests.....	13
General Issuances .....	13
Specific Issuances .....	13
Increases in Authorized Capital .....	13
Reduction of Capital .....	13
Capital Structures .....	14
Preferred Stock.....	14
Debt Issuance Requests.....	14
Pledging of Assets for Debt.....	14
Increase in Borrowing Powers .....	15
Share Repurchase Plans.....	15
Reissuance of Repurchased Shares .....	15
Capitalization of Reserves for Bonus Issues/Increase in Par Value .....	16
<b>4. Compensation</b> .....	<b>17</b>
Compensation Plans .....	17
Director Compensation.....	17
<b>5. Reorganizations/Restructurings</b> .....	<b>18</b>
<b>6. Mergers and Acquisitions</b> .....	<b>19</b>

<b>7. Miscellaneous and Other Proposals</b> .....	<b>20</b>
Expansion of Business Activities .....	20
Related-Party Transactions.....	20
Mandatory Takeover Bid Waivers .....	20
Reincorporation Proposals .....	20
<b>8. Anti-Takeover Mechanisms</b> .....	<b>21</b>
<b>9. Shareholder Proposals</b> .....	<b>22</b>
<b>10. Social and Environmental Issues</b> .....	<b>23</b>
General Approach.....	23
Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals.....	23
Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals.....	24
<b>11. Foreign Private Issuers Listed on U.S. Exchanges</b> .....	<b>25</b>

## Coverage Universe

This document applies to all Asian Pacific markets (excluding Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, India, and Korea, which have separate market policies). Currently this includes Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and Papua New Guinea. Any Asian Pacific markets added to ISS coverage would likely be included under this regional policy.

# 1. Operational Items

## Approval of Financial Statements and Statutory Reports

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote for approval of financial statements, report of board of directors, supervisors, and independent directors and other statutory reports unless there are concerns about the accounts presented or audit procedures used.

## Appointment of Auditors and Auditor Fees

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote for the (re)election of auditors and/or proposals authorizing the board to fix auditor fees, unless:

- There are serious concerns about the accounts presented or the audit procedures used;
- The auditors are being changed without explanation; or
- Non-audit-related fees are substantial or are routinely in excess of standard annual audit-related fees.

In circumstances where fees for non-audit services include fees related to significant one-time capital structure events (initial public offerings, bankruptcy emergencies, and spinoffs) and the company makes public disclosure of the amount and nature of those fees, which are an exception to the standard "non-audit fee" category, then such fees may be excluded from the non-audit fees considered in determining the ratio of non-audit to audit fees.

For concerns related to the audit procedures, independence of auditors, and/or name of auditors, ISS may recommend against the auditor (re)election. For concerns related to fees paid to the auditors, ISS may recommend against remuneration of auditors if this is a separate voting item; otherwise ISS may recommend against the auditor election.

## Appointment of Internal Statutory Auditors

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote for the appointment or (re)election of statutory auditors, unless:

- There are serious concerns about the statutory reports presented or the audit procedures used;
- Questions exist concerning any of the statutory auditors being appointed; or
- The auditors have previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered affiliated with the company.

## Allocation of Income/Dividend Distribution

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote for approval of the allocation of income, unless:

- The dividend payout ratio has been consistently low without adequate explanation; or
- The payout is excessive given the company's financial position.

## Stock (Scrip) Dividend Alternative

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote for most stock (scrip) dividend proposals.

Vote against proposals that do not allow for a cash option unless management demonstrates that the cash option is harmful to shareholder value.

## Amendments to Articles of Association

**General Recommendation:** Vote amendments to the articles of association on a case-by-case basis.

## Change in Company Fiscal Term

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote for resolutions to change a company's fiscal term unless a company's motivation for the change is to postpone its AGM.

## Lower Disclosure Threshold for Stock Ownership

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote against resolutions to lower the stock ownership disclosure threshold below 5 percent unless specific reasons exist to implement a lower threshold.

## Amend Quorum Requirements

**General Recommendation:** Vote proposals to amend quorum requirements for shareholder meetings on a case-by-case basis.

## Transact Other Business

**General Recommendation:** Vote against other business when it appears as a voting item.

## 2. Board of Directors

### Director Elections

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote for management nominees in the election of directors, except for the following:

### Independence

**Overall Board Independence:** Per the independence standards in [ISS' Classification of Directors](#), vote against non-independent director nominees:

- For **Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines**, if the board is less than one-third independent;
- For **Sri Lanka and Pakistan**, if independent directors represent less than the higher of two independent directors or one-third of the board; or
- For **Bangladesh**, if the board is less than one-fifth independent.

### Committee Independence:

- For **Malaysia, Thailand, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka**, vote against an executive director serving on the audit, remuneration, or nomination committees.

In making the above recommendations, ISS generally will not recommend against the election of a CEO/president, executive chairman, or founder who is integral to the company.

**Employee Representatives:** Vote for employee and/or labor representatives if they sit on either the audit or compensation committee and are required by law to be on those committees. Vote against employee and/or labor representatives if they sit on either the audit or compensation committee, if they are not required to be on those committees.

### Composition

#### Attendance:

- Vote against individual directors if repeated absences at board meetings have not been explained (in countries where this information is disclosed);
- For **Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines**, vote against the election of a board-nominated candidate who has attended less than 75 percent of board and key committee meetings over the most recent fiscal year without a satisfactory explanation. For **Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka**, vote against if he/she attended less than 75 percent of board meetings<sup>1</sup> without a satisfactory explanation. Acceptable reasons for director absences are generally limited to the following:
  - Medical issues/illness;
  - Family emergencies;
  - The director has served on the board for less than a year; and
  - Missing only one meeting (when the total of all meetings is three or fewer).

Generally, vote against the director nominees if no disclosure of board attendance is provided in the latest fiscal year.

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<sup>1</sup> Attendance disclosure for some markets is for board meetings only, others will provide disclosure for both board and committee meetings. See pages 10-12 of the [2017 ISS Asia-Pacific Policy Updates](#) for a comparison chart of attendance disclosure.

**Overboarding:**

For the **Philippines**, vote against the election of a board-nominated candidate who sits on more than a total of five (5) publicly-listed boards.

**Gender Diversity:**

For **Malaysia**, generally vote against all members of the nomination committee up for reelection if the board has no woman director. For companies with **market capitalization of below MYR 2 billion as at Dec. 31, 2021**, this policy will be effective for meetings on or after **June 1, 2023**.

In making these recommendations, ISS generally will not recommend against the election of a CEO/president, executive chairman, or founder who is integral to the company.

**Accountability****Problematic Audit-Related Practices:**

Generally vote against all members of the audit committee up for reelection if:

- The non-audit fees paid to the auditor are excessive<sup>2</sup>; or
- The company did not disclose the audit fees and/or non-audit fees in the latest fiscal year.

**Climate Accountability**

For companies that are significant greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters, through their operations or value chain<sup>3</sup>, generally vote against the responsible incumbent director(s), or any other appropriate item(s) in cases where ISS determines that the company is not taking the minimum steps needed to understand, assess, and mitigate risks related to climate change to the company and the larger economy.

Minimum steps to understand and mitigate those risks are considered to be the following. Both minimum criteria will be required to be in alignment with the policy:

- Detailed disclosure of climate-related risks, such as according to the framework established by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), including:
  - Board governance measures;
  - Corporate strategy;
  - Risk management analyses; and
  - Metrics and targets.
- Appropriate GHG emissions reduction targets.

At this time, “appropriate GHG emissions reductions targets” will be medium-term GHG reduction targets or Net Zero-by-2050 GHG reduction targets for a company’s operations (Scope 1) and electricity use (Scope 2). Targets should cover the vast majority of the company’s direct emissions.

**Governance Failures:**

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<sup>2</sup> The non-audit fees have constituted more than 50 percent of the total auditor compensation during the fiscal year. ISS will make an exception if the excessive non-audit fees are in relation to special projects or due to unusual circumstances and are not recurring in nature and are unlikely to create conflicts of interest.

<sup>3</sup> Companies defined as “significant GHG emitters” will be those on the current Climate Action 100+ Focus Group list.



Vote against the election of directors if:

- The name(s) of the nominee(s) is not disclosed in a timely manner prior to the meeting.
- Adequate disclosure has not been provided in a timely manner;
- There are clear concerns over questionable finances or restatements;
- There have been questionable transactions with conflicts of interest;
- There are any records of abuses against minority shareholder interests; or
- The board fails to meet minimum corporate governance standards.

Under extraordinary circumstances, vote against individual directors, members of a committee, or the entire board, due to:

- Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight (including, but not limited to, environmental, social, and climate change issues), or fiduciary responsibilities at the company;
- Failure to replace management as appropriate; or
- Egregious actions related to a director's service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.

## Classification of Directors

### Executive Director

- Employee or executive of the company or a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company;
- Any director who is classified as a non-executive, but receives salary, fees, bonus, and/or other benefits that are in line with the highest-paid executives of the company.

### Non-Independent Non-Executive Director (NED)

- Any director who is attested by the board to be a non-independent NED;
- Any director specifically designated as a representative of a shareholder of the company;
- Any director who is also an employee or executive of a significant<sup>[1]</sup> shareholder of the company;
- Any director who is also an employee or executive of a subsidiary, associate, joint venture, or company that is affiliated with a significant<sup>[1]</sup> shareholder of the company;
- Any director who is nominated by a dissenting significant shareholder, unless there is a clear lack of material<sup>[2]</sup> connection with the dissident, either currently or historically;
- Beneficial owner (direct or indirect) of at least 10 percent of the company's stock, either in economic terms or in voting rights (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a defined group, e.g., family members who beneficially own less than 10 percent individually, but collectively own more than 10 percent), unless market best practice dictates a lower ownership and/or disclosure threshold (and in other special market-specific circumstances);
- Government representative;
- Currently provides or has provided (or a relative<sup>[3]</sup> provides) professional services<sup>[4]</sup> to the company, to an affiliate of the company, or to an individual officer of the company or of one of its affiliates in the latest fiscal year in excess of USD 10,000 per year;
- Represents customer, supplier, creditor, banker, or other entity with which the company maintains transactional/commercial relationship (unless company discloses information to apply a materiality test<sup>[5]</sup>);
- Any director who has a conflicting relationship with the company, including but not limited to cross-directorships with executive directors or the chairman of the company;
- Relative<sup>[3]</sup> of a current employee or executive of the company or its affiliates;
- Relative<sup>[3]</sup> of a former employee or executive of the company or its affiliates;
- A new appointee elected other than by a formal process through the General Meeting (such as a contractual appointment by a substantial shareholder);
- Founder/co-founder/member of founding family but not currently an employee or executive;
- Former employee or executive (five-year cooling off period);
- For the **Philippines**, any director who has served more than nine years, unless the company provides sufficient and clear justification that the director is independent;
- For **Malaysia**, any director who has served more than nine years, unless the confirmation of independence is approved at a General Meeting;
- Any additional relationship or principle considered to compromise independence under local corporate governance best practice guidance.

### Independent NED

- No material<sup>[2]</sup> connection, either directly or indirectly, to the company (other than a board seat) or the dissenting significant shareholder.

### Employee Representative

- Represents employees or employee shareholders of the company (classified as “employee representative” but considered a non-independent NED).

### Footnotes:

[1] At least 10 percent of the company's stock, unless market best practice dictates a lower ownership and/or disclosure threshold.

[2] For purposes of ISS' director independence classification, “material” will be defined as a standard of relationship financial, personal, or otherwise that a reasonable person might conclude could potentially influence one's objectivity in the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an individual's ability to satisfy requisite fiduciary standards on behalf of shareholders.

[3] “Relative” follows the definition of “immediate family members” which covers spouses, parents, children, stepparents, step-children, siblings, in-laws, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household of any director, nominee for director, executive officer, or significant shareholder of the company.

[4] Professional services can be characterized as advisory in nature and generally include the following: investment banking/financial advisory services; commercial banking (beyond deposit services); investment services; insurance services; accounting/audit services; consulting services; marketing services; and legal services. The case of participation in a banking syndicate by a non-lead bank should be considered a transaction (and hence subject to the associated materiality test) rather than a professional relationship.

[5] A business relationship may be material if the transaction value (of all outstanding transactions) entered into between the company and the company or organization with which the director is associated is equivalent to either 1 percent of the company's turnover or 1 percent of the turnover of the company or organization with which the director is associated. OR, A business relationship may be material if the transaction value (of all outstanding financing operations) entered into between the company and the company or organization with which the director is associated is more than 10 percent of the company's shareholder equity or the transaction value, (of all outstanding financing operations), compared to the company's total assets, is more than 5 percent.

## Contested Director Elections

**General Recommendation:** For contested elections of directors, e.g. the election of shareholder nominees or the dismissal of incumbent directors, ISS will make its recommendation on a case-by-case basis, determining which directors are best suited to add value for shareholders.

The analysis will generally be based on, but not limited to, the following major decision factors:

- Company performance relative to its peers;
- Strategy of the incumbents versus the dissidents;
- Independence of directors/nominees;
- Experience and skills of board candidates;
- Governance profile of the company;
- Evidence of management entrenchment;
- Responsiveness to shareholders;
- Whether a takeover offer has been rebuffed;
- Whether minority or majority representation is being sought.

When analyzing a contested election of directors, ISS will generally focus on two central questions: (1) Have the dissidents proved that board change is warranted? And (2) if so, are the dissident board nominees likely to effect positive change (i.e., maximize long-term shareholder value).

## Discharge of Directors

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote for the discharge of directors, including members of the management board and/or supervisory board, *unless* there is reliable information about significant and compelling controversies as to whether the board is fulfilling its fiduciary duties, as evidenced by:

- A lack of oversight or actions by board members that invoke shareholder distrust related to malfeasance or poor supervision, such as operating in private or company interest rather than in shareholder interest; or
- Any legal proceedings (either civil or criminal) aiming to hold the board responsible for breach of trust in the past or related to currently alleged actions yet to be confirmed (and not only the fiscal year in question), such as price fixing, insider trading, bribery, fraud, and other illegal actions; or
- Other egregious governance issues where shareholders will bring legal action against the company or its directors.

For markets that do not routinely request discharge resolutions (e.g., common law countries or markets where discharge is not mandatory), analysts may voice concern in other appropriate agenda items, such as approval of the annual accounts or other relevant resolutions, to enable shareholders to express discontent with the board.

## Director, Officer, and Auditor Indemnification and Liability Provisions

**General Recommendation:** Vote proposals seeking indemnification and liability protection for directors and officers on a case-by-case basis.

Vote against proposals to indemnify external auditors.

## Board Structure

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote for proposals to fix board size.

Vote against the introduction of classified boards and mandatory retirement ages for directors.

Vote against proposals to alter board structure or size in the context of a fight for control of the company or the board.

## 3. Capital Structure

### Share Issuance Requests

#### General Issuances

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote for issuance requests with preemptive rights to a maximum of 100 percent over currently issued capital.

Vote for issuance requests without preemptive rights to a maximum of 20 percent of currently issued capital.

#### *Malaysia:*

For companies listed on the Main Market and ACE Market of the Bursa Malaysia Securities Bhd (Exchange), vote for issuance requests without preemptive rights to a maximum of 10 percent of currently issued capital.

For real estate investment trusts (REITs), vote for issuance requests without preemptive rights to a maximum of 20 percent of currently issued capital.

#### Specific Issuances

**General Recommendation:** Vote on a case-by-case basis on all requests, with or without preemptive rights.

### Increases in Authorized Capital

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote for non-specific proposals to increase authorized capital up to 100 percent over the current authorization unless the increase would leave the company with less than 30 percent of its new authorization outstanding.

Vote for specific proposals to increase authorized capital to any amount, unless:

- The specific purpose of the increase (such as a share-based acquisition or merger) does not meet ISS guidelines for the purpose being proposed; or
- The increase would leave the company with less than 30 percent of its new authorization outstanding after adjusting for all proposed issuances.

Vote against proposals to adopt unlimited capital authorizations.

### Reduction of Capital

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote for proposals to reduce capital for routine accounting purposes unless the terms are unfavorable to shareholders.

Vote proposals to reduce capital in connection with corporate restructuring on a case-by-case basis.

## Capital Structures

**General Recommendation:** Vote for resolutions that seek to maintain or convert to a one-share, one-vote capital structure.

Vote against requests for the creation or continuation of dual-class capital structures or the creation of new or additional super voting shares.

## Preferred Stock

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote for the creation of a new class of preferred stock or for issuances of preferred stock up to 50 percent of issued capital unless the terms of the preferred stock would adversely affect the rights of existing shareholders.

Generally vote for the creation/issuance of convertible preferred stock as long as the maximum number of common shares that could be issued upon conversion meets ISS guidelines on equity issuance requests.

Generally vote against the creation of a new class of preference shares that would carry superior voting rights to the common shares.

Generally vote against the creation of blank check preferred stock unless the board clearly states that the authorization will not be used to thwart a takeover bid.

Vote proposals to increase blank check preferred authorizations on a case-by-case basis.

## Debt Issuance Requests

**General Recommendation:** Vote non-convertible debt issuance requests on a case-by-case basis, with or without preemptive rights.

Vote for the creation/issuance of convertible debt instruments as long as the maximum number of common shares that could be issued upon conversion meets ISS guidelines on equity issuance requests.

Vote for proposals to restructure existing debt arrangements unless the terms of the restructuring would adversely affect the rights of shareholders.

## Pledging of Assets for Debt

**General Recommendation:** Vote proposals to approve the pledging of assets for debt on a case-by-case basis.

## Increase in Borrowing Powers

**General Recommendation:** Vote proposals to approve increases in a company's borrowing powers on a case-by-case basis.

## Share Repurchase Plans

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote for market repurchase authorities (share repurchase programs) if the terms comply with the following criteria:

- A repurchase limit of up to 10 percent of outstanding issued share capital;
- A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company's issued share capital in treasury ("on the shelf"); and
- A duration of no more than five years, or such lower threshold as may be set by applicable law, regulation or code of governance best practice.

Authorities to repurchase shares in excess of the 10 percent repurchase limit will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. ISS may support such share repurchase authorities under special circumstances, which are required to be publicly disclosed by the company, provided that, on balance, the proposal is in shareholders' interests. In such cases, the authority must comply with the following criteria:

- A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company's issued share capital in treasury ("on the shelf"); and
- A duration of no more than 18 months.

In markets where it is normal practice not to provide a repurchase limit, ISS will evaluate the proposal based on the company's historical practice. However, ISS expects companies to disclose such limits and, in the future, may recommend a vote against companies that fail to do so. In such cases, the authority must comply with the following criteria:

- A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company's issued share capital in treasury ("on the shelf"); and
- A duration of no more than 18 months.

In addition, vote against any proposal where:

- The repurchase can be used for takeover defenses;
- There is clear evidence of abuse;
- There is no safeguard against selective buybacks; and/or
- Pricing provisions and safeguards are deemed to be unreasonable in light of market practice.

## Reissuance of Repurchased Shares

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote for requests to reissue any repurchased shares unless there is clear evidence of abuse of this authority in the past.

## Capitalization of Reserves for Bonus Issues/Increase in Par Value

**General Recommendation:** Vote for requests to capitalize reserves for bonus issues of shares or to increase par value.



## 4. Compensation

### Compensation Plans

**General Recommendation:** Vote compensation plans on a case-by-case basis.

For Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam generally vote for option plans and restricted share plans.

Vote against an option plan<sup>4</sup> if:

- The maximum dilution level for the plan exceeds:
  - 5 percent of issued share capital for a mature company (this may be increased to 10 percent if the plan includes other positive features such as a challenging performance criteria and meaningful vesting periods as these partially offset dilution concerns by reducing the likelihood that options will become exercisable or performance shares are issued unless there is a clear improvement in shareholder value);
  - 10 percent for a growth company; or
- The plan permits options to be issued with an exercise price at a discount to the current market price.

Vote against a restricted share plan if:

- The maximum dilution level for the plan exceeds 5 percent of issued share capital for a mature company or 10 percent for a growth company; or
- The plan does not include a challenging performance criteria and meaningful vesting periods to partially offset dilution concerns by reducing the likelihood that performance shares are issued unless there is a clear improvement in shareholder value.

### Director Compensation

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote for proposals to award cash fees to non-executive directors unless the amounts are excessive relative to other companies in the country or industry.

Vote non-executive director compensation proposals that include both cash and share-based components on a case-by-case basis.

Vote proposals that bundle compensation for both non-executive and executive directors into a single resolution on a case-by-case basis.

Generally vote against proposals to introduce retirement benefits for non-executive directors.

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<sup>4</sup> For Thailand, proposals to issue warrants to directors, executives and/or employees of the listed issuer and its subsidiaries will be treated as stock option grants.

## 5. Reorganizations/Restructurings

**General Recommendation:** Vote reorganizations and restructurings on a case-by-case basis.

## 6. Mergers and Acquisitions

For every M&A analysis, ISS reviews publicly available information as of the date of the report and evaluates the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:

**General Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following:

- Valuation - Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, ISS places emphasis on the offer premium, market reaction, and strategic rationale.
- Market reaction - How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction will cause ISS to scrutinize a deal more closely.
- Strategic rationale - Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions.
- Conflicts of interest - Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders? ISS will consider whether any special interests may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger.
- Governance - Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction? If the governance profile is to change for the worse, the burden is on the company to prove that other issues (such as valuation) outweigh any deterioration in governance.

Vote against if the companies do not provide sufficient information upon request to make an informed voting decision.

## 7. Miscellaneous and Other Proposals

### Expansion of Business Activities

**General Recommendation:** Vote for resolutions to expand business activities unless the new business takes the company into risky areas.

### Related-Party Transactions

**General Recommendation:** In evaluating resolutions that seek shareholder approval on related-party transactions (RPTs), vote on a case-by-case basis, considering factors including, but not limited to, the following:

- The parties on either side of the transaction;
- The nature of the asset to be transferred/service to be provided;
- The pricing of the transaction (and any associated professional valuation);
- The views of independent directors (where provided);
- The views of an independent financial adviser (where appointed);
- Whether any entities party to the transaction (including advisers) is conflicted; and
- The stated rationale for the transaction, including discussions of timing.

If there is a transaction that ISS deemed problematic and that was not put to a shareholder vote, ISS may recommend against the election of the director(s) involved in the related-party transaction or against the full board.

### Mandatory Takeover Bid Waivers

**General Recommendation:** Vote proposals to waive mandatory takeover bid requirements on a case-by-case basis.

### Reincorporation Proposals

**General Recommendation:** Vote reincorporation proposals on a case-by-case basis.

## 8. Anti-Takeover Mechanisms

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote against all anti-takeover proposals, unless they are structured in such a way that they give shareholders the ultimate decision on any proposal or offer.

## 9. Shareholder Proposals

**General Recommendation:** Vote shareholder proposals on a case-by-case basis.

Generally vote for proposals that would improve the company's corporate governance or business profile at a reasonable cost.

Generally vote against proposals that limit the company's business activities or capabilities or result in significant costs being incurred with little or no benefit.

## 10. Social and Environmental Issues

### General Approach

ISS applies a common approach globally to evaluating social and environmental proposals which cover a wide range of topics, including consumer and product safety, environment and energy, labor standards and human rights, workplace and board diversity, and corporate political issues. While a variety of factors goes into each analysis, the overall principle guiding all vote recommendations focuses on how the proposal may enhance or protect shareholder value in either the short or long term.

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote case-by-case, examining primarily whether implementation of the proposal is likely to enhance or protect shareholder value. The following factors will be considered:

- If the issues presented in the proposal are being appropriately or effectively dealt with through legislation or government regulation;
- If the company has already responded in an appropriate and sufficient manner to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;
- Whether the proposal's request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive;
- The company's approach compared with any industry standard practices for addressing the issue(s) raised by the proposal;
- Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company's practices related to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;
- If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether reasonable and sufficient information is currently available to shareholders from the company or from other publicly available sources; and
- If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether implementation would reveal proprietary or confidential information that could place the company at a competitive disadvantage.

### Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals

**General Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on management proposals that request shareholders to approve the company's climate transition action plan<sup>5</sup>, taking into account the completeness and rigor of the plan. Information that will be considered where available includes the following:

- The extent to which the company's climate related disclosures are in line with TCFD recommendations and meet other market standards;
- Disclosure of its operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3);
- The completeness and rigor of company's short-, medium-, and long-term targets for reducing operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3 if relevant);
- Whether the company has sought and approved third-party approval that its targets are science-based;
- Whether the company has made a commitment to be "net zero" for operational and supply chain emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3) by 2050;
- Whether the company discloses a commitment to report on the implementation of its plan in subsequent years;
- Whether the company's climate data has received third-party assurance;
- Disclosure of how the company's lobbying activities and its capital expenditures align with company strategy;

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<sup>5</sup> Variations of this request also include climate transition related ambitions, or commitment to reporting on the implementation of a climate plan.

- Whether there are specific industry decarbonization challenges; and
- The company's related commitment, disclosure, and performance compared to its industry peers.

## Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals

**General Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that request the company to disclose a report providing its GHG emissions levels and reduction targets and/or its upcoming/approved climate transition action plan and provide shareholders the opportunity to express approval or disapproval of its GHG emissions reduction plan, taking into account information such as the following:

- The completeness and rigor of the company's climate-related disclosure;
- The company's actual GHG emissions performance;
- Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to its GHG emissions; and
- Whether the proposal's request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive.



## 11. Foreign Private Issuers Listed on U.S. Exchanges

Foreign private issuers ("FPIs") are defined as companies whose business is administered principally outside the U.S., with more than 50 percent of assets located outside the U.S.; a majority of whose directors/officers are not U.S. citizens or residents; and a majority of whose outstanding voting shares are held by non-residents of the U.S.

Companies that are incorporated outside of the U.S. and listed solely on U.S. exchanges, where they qualify as FPIs, will be subject to the following policy:

**General Recommendation:** Vote against (or withhold from) non-independent director nominees at companies which fail to meet the following criteria: a majority-independent board, and the presence of an audit, a compensation, and a nomination committee, each of which is entirely composed of independent directors.

Where the design and disclosure levels of equity compensation plans are comparable to those seen at U.S. companies, U.S. compensation policy will be used to evaluate the compensation plan proposals. In all other cases, equity compensation plans will be evaluated according to ISS' Asia-Pacific Regional Proxy Voting Guidelines.

All other voting items will be evaluated using the relevant ISS regional or market proxy voting guidelines.

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